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Review of Labor and
Employment Law Decisions
from the United States Supreme
Court's 2010-2011 Term
Eric Schnapper*
I. Introduction
In the 2010-11 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided nine signi-
ficant labor and employment cases. Although some of these cases
affected only the construction of a specific statute or constitutional
provision, several of them addressed issues likely to affect the inter-
pretation and implementation of a wide range of federal employment
laws. Most of these decisions, rather than definitively resolving a ques-
tion, raise a range of new issues likely to be litigated for years to come.
Thus, for practitioners and academics alike, recognizing the new ques-
tions that have now been raised is at least as important as under-
standing what matters the Court put to rest.
II. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes'
The most publicized and least clear employment decision of the
term was Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. The plaintiffs alleged that
the retail giant had engaged in gender-based discrimination in pay
and promotions, and sought to represent a class of about 1.5 million
women who worked at Wal-Mart stores throughout the country. 2 The
district court certified such a class, and a sharply divided en banc
Ninth Circuit substantially affirmed that order.3
*Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; LL.B. 1968, Yale Law
School. Professor Schnapper served for twenty-five years as an assistant counsel to the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, where he specialized in appellate litiga-
tion and legislative activities. He has handled more than eighty U.S. Supreme Court
cases and argued three 6f them in 2010-11. Professor Schnapper argued Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP; Staub v. Proctor Hospital; and Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri; and represented the petitioner in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics, Corp.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. Id. at 2547.
3. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd in relevant
part, 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev'd, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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The Supreme Court overturned the certification order on three
distinct grounds. First, by a 5-4 majority the Court held that certifica-
tion was improper because the plaintiffs failed to establish that there
were "questions of law or fact common to the class," as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2).4 Second, the Court held
unanimously that in cases seeking individualized monetary awards,
a class must be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), not (as had been common
in employment discrimination cases) under Rule 23(b)(2). 5 Third, the
Court unanimously agreed that in a class action seeking monetary
relief, a defendant ordinarily has a right to demand individualized
hearings regarding whether a particular class member was a victim
of unlawful conduct and regarding the amount of monetary relief to
which the individual is entitled.'
The Dukes decision seems likely to affect class actions to enforce
any federal labor or employment law. Whether the decision will affect
collective actions is already being litigated in the lower courts.7 The
opinion also raises important questions regarding the type of evidence
that can be relied on to establish the existence of systemic intentional
discrimination.8
A. Commonality
The Court's discussion of Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement is
unlike most Supreme Court decisions. Ordinarily, the Court grants re-
view to decide a specific, identified question of law, and in resolving
that issue, the Court establishes a standard to control similar future
cases. In Dukes, on the other hand, the majority's discussion of com-
monality reads much like a district court decision, piling reason
upon reason for concluding that the requisite commonality was not es-
tablished.9 Many of the majority's objections to the class are no more
than a paragraph long; some are set out in only a sentence or two. This
cascade of arguments, although often written in the pointed style for
which Justice Scalia is renowned, does not set forth specific standards
to guide the lower courts.
Evaluating the Court's commonality analysis is complicated by
the truly unique circumstances of the case. The proposed class action
would have challenged the conduct of thousands of managers who
worked in approximately 3,400 different stores.10 The promotion and
4. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548, 2558 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)).
5. Id. at 2557.
6. Id. at 2560.
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. For further analysis of this issue, see Mary Dunn Baker, Certification Statisti-
cal Analyses Post-Dukes, 27 A.B.A. J. LB. & EMp. L. 471 (2012).
9. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-57.
10. Id. at 2555.
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payment practices involved tens of millions of decisions over several
years. The sheer magnitude of the class claims posed unprecedented
difficulty for class representatives seeking to establish the existence
of common issues.'1 In addition, the nature of the underlying discrimi-
nation claim-at least as described by the majority opinion-was quite
unusual. The plaintiffs seemingly neither argued that there was a pat-
tern and practice of widespread intentional discrimination nor as-
serted that a general practice (such as a promotion test, or the use
of a highly subjective interview standard) had a disparate impact on
women. Rather-or, at least, in the eyes of the majority-the plaintiffs
claimed that Wal-Mart had no standard practices or covert discrimina-
tory policy, but had simply allowed each of the thousands of managers
to make salary and promotion decisions on whatever basis they
pleased. 12 Plaintiffs claimed it was that very lack of company-wide
standards that had somehow led to significant differences in the over-
all wages and promotion rates of men and women. It is unclear how
much the Court's various objections stemmed from either the class
size or the nature of the plaintiffs' claims, and thus might not apply
(or might have less force) if a proposed class was smaller, or a plaintiff
were advancing a more traditional and specific theory of liability.
B. Pattern or Practice of Intentional Discrimination
For more than four decades, class actions involving employment
discrimination claims have been repeatedly certified and successfully
litigated.13 Many of these concerned a practice that (if it occurred)
was clearly unlawful, such as intentional discrimination on the basis
of race or gender. The common question in these cases was whether
that type of unlawful action was in fact widespread. If such intentional
discrimination was found to be sufficiently common to constitute a
pattern or practice, the burden of proof would shift to the defendant
to prove that any particular class member was not a victim of
discrimination. 14
Much of the Court's decision is consistent with continuing to re-
gard such cases as presenting a common question. The opinion repeat-
edly refers to pattern or practice cases and the burden of proof shift re-
sulting from a finding of such systemic discrimination.' 5 Thus, a claim
that there was a pattern or practice would evidently satisfy Dukes'
11. Id. at 2552.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Godbolt v. Hughes Tool Co., 63 F.R.D. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (race
discrimination).
14. See, e.g., Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977)).
15. See, e.g., id. at 2552, 2552 n.7, 2561.
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requirement that there be "a common contention" that would be "cen-
tral to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 16
It was never particularly clear from lower court decisions just how
widespread discrimination had to be to constitute a pattern or prac-
tice. The Court's opinion describes the requisite showing in inconsis-
tent loose language that seems likely to provoke disputes about
what must be shown to establish a pattern or practice. The opinion re-
fers, for example, to a showing that intentional discrimination is "typi-
cal"' 7 (a standard that might mean a majority of all decisions) or is an
employer's "standard operating procedure"' 8 (a standard that sounds
more like perhaps three-quarters of all decisions). Plaintiffs' expert
had acknowledged he was unsure whether 0.5% or 95% of employment
decisions at Wal-Mart were the result of stereotyped thinking.' 9
Whether it was 0.5% or 95%, the Court stated, "is the essential ques-
tion on which [plaintiffs'] theory of commonality depends."20 Actually,
the question is how much more than 0.5% is required. There are many
levels of discrimination greater than 0.5% but less than 95%; it is
unclear whether the opinion means commonality requires something
more than 0.5%, or no less than 95%, or (most likely) something in
between. The Court also refers repeatedly (but not invariably) to a
showing that discrimination was the employer's "policy" or "general
policy."2 ' This suggests a plaintiff would have to prove that discrimina-
tion was not merely widespread, but also centrally directed and en-
dorsed. No such showing had been required in the past. Although it
seems unlikely that the majority intended to change the standard
for establishing a pattern or practice, the opinion may well stir up
new disagreements in this area.
At times, the decision describes what the plaintiffs failed to show
in a manner that invites an attack on any Rule 23 pattern or practice
certification. The class representatives, the Court held, failed to de-
monstrate that there was "a system pervaded by impermissible inten-
tional discrimination."2 2 The evidence did not "establish the uniform,
store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs' theory of commonal-
ity depends."23 "[A] uniform employment practice ... would provide
the commonality needed for a class action . . . . "24 It was "impossible
to say that examination of all the class members' claims for relief will
16. Id. at 2551.
17. Id. at 2555 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982)).
18. Id. at 2552 n.7 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358).
19. Id. at 2553.
20. Id. at 2554.
21. Id. at 2553-56.
22. Id. at 2555 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91
(1988)).
23. Id. at 2555.
24. Id. at 2554.
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produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfa-
vored."25 "[Ilt is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise
their discretion in a common way without some common direction." 26
These passages suggest that, to obtain certification, a plaintiff must
adduce evidence that all (or almost all) decisions were the result of in-
tentional discrimination, or perhaps show that systemic discrimina-
tion occurred at every single one of the defendant's 3,400 stores.
Under this view, the common question a plaintiff would have to estab-
lish would not be whether there was a pattern or practice of inten-
tional discrimination. Rather, the question would be whether every
one of the adverse promotion and wage decisions affecting class mem-
bers was the result of intentional discrimination. That common issue
would be more than a question "central to the validity of each one of
the claims" as required by Rule 23(a)(2); the common question actually
would have to be the validity of every claim. But that would be incon-
sistent with other portions of the opinion explaining that the class
representative need only show the existence of a single common
question.27
One passage in the opinion suggests that commonality can be
defeated by the mere possibility that, in response to evidence of a
company-wide pattern or practice, the employer might offer, as an ex-
planation for an apparent pattern of discrimination, different defenses
for particular class members, stores, or supervisors. Specifically, the
Court stated:
Even if [statistical proof] established . .. a pay or promotion pattern
... in all of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores, that would still not demonstrate
that commonality of issue exists. Some managers will claim that the
availability of women, or qualified women, or interested women, in
their stores' area does not mirror the national or regional statistics.
And almost all of them will claim to have been applying some sex-
neutral, performance-based criteria-whose nature and effects will
differ from store to store.28
On this account, the plaintiffs would be required to establish not
merely that there was a common issue, but that the issue, including
whatever defenses the employer might offer, would be common to
the entire class. If that is what Rule 23 demands, it would seem to
bar company-wide class actions, even in a single plant with multiple
decisionmakers, simply because those officials might, for example,
offer different explanations for why they were all paying women less
than comparable men. That conclusion, however, seems inconsistent
with much of the rest of the opinion.
25. Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 2555.
27. See, e.g., id. at 2556.
28. Id. at 2555 (second emphasis added).
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C. The Required Amount of Proof of Systemic Discrimination
The opinion makes clear that, by requiring the existence of a ques-
tion of law or fact common to the class, Rule 23(a)(2) does more than
establish a pleading requirement. Where, for example, plaintiffs con-
tend the common question concerns the legality of a class-wide promo-
tion requirement, plaintiffs must offer evidence that the requirement
was indeed utilized. Similarly, where plaintiffs allege the existence
of a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination, Dukes holds
that the class representative must adduce some evidence that such a
pattern or practice actually exists.29
How much evidence the Court requires is far from clear. The
opinion refers, variously, to whether the evidence adduced would be
"significant proof" of a pattern or practice,3 0 would "establish that
[the plaintiffs'] theory can be proved on a classwide basis,"31 or would
"raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel
decisions are discriminatory."32 The plaintiffs were faulted for having
failed to provide "convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory...
policy."33 These passages could be read as requiring anything from
merely some evidence of a pattern or practice, to proof showing by
clear and convincing evidence that such a pattern or practice actually
exists.
The existence of some evidentiary requirement is not new. Plain-
tiffs' counsel in pattern or practice class actions have generally under-
stood that they ought to introduce at least some evidence of discrimi-
nation at the certification hearing. Some lawyers have gone further,
attempting to amass and introduce at that hearing essentially the
same evidence they intend to offer at trial. After Dukes it may be
imprudent to do any less.
Precisely because of Dukes' evidentiary requirement, it will be
more difficult for a district court to limit a class representative's pre-
certification discovery. In the absence of any clear indication in
Dukes as to how much (if at all) its requirement differs from the degree
of proof required to prevail at trial or to survive summary judgment,
plaintiffs now have a substantial argument that prior to a certification
hearing, they are entitled to essentially the same discovery they would
get post-certification. Thus, the standard that worked to the advan-
tage of the defendant in Dukes may, in this regard, be unfavorable to
future defendants.
In any event, as the amount of discovery and evidence offered at
the certification hearing increases in response to Dukes, the certifica-
29. See id. at 2551-52.
30. Id. at 2553-54.
31. Id. at 2555.
32. Id. at 2556.
33. Id.
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tion hearing and decision will increasingly resemble an actual trial on
the merits. If the factual findings in a certification decision were law
of the case as to the merits, the certification hearing would be the
trial on the merits. At the least, a certification decision based on com-
pelling evidence of a pattern or practice may leave little doubt as to the
outcome of a trial. To the extent that the district judge at the certifica-
tion hearing moves closer to deciding the merits of the class claim, and
to the extent that pre-certification discovery unearths much of the evi-
dence that would be adduced at trial, those changes will moot the issue
of what degree of a showing is needed to obtain certification and thus
obtain a trial on the merits, which was the very issue in Dukes.
D. Collective Actions
Collective claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) 34 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)35 are treated
and certified as collective actions under the provisions of those sta-
tutes, rather than certified as Rule 23 class actions. 36 Potential
claimants must affirmatively opt into a collective action. While Rule
23(a)(2) requires a showing of a question "common to the class,"37
final certification of a collective action requires a showing that the clai-
mants to be included within that action are "similarly situated"38 to
the original plaintiffs. Although Dukes does not literally apply to a
collective action, defendants are already arguing that at least some
of the reasoning in the Supreme Court's decision should be utilized
in deciding whether to certify a collective action.39
Efforts to invoke Dukes to defeat collective actions are likely to
raise a number of distinct questions. In an FLSA case in which the ex-
istence of some common general practice (e.g., not paying workers for
certain walking time) is undisputed, the Dukes commonality analysis
seems unlikely to help defendants because those practices would be
similar to disparate-impact claims, which the Court regarded as pre-
senting a quintessential common question. 40 On the other hand,
ADEA collective actions in which plaintiffs allege a pattern or practice
of intentional age-based discrimination present a claim similar to a
Title VII pattern or practice case. The relevance of Dukes in such
cases will depend on the differences between the Rule 23 commonality
requirement and the ADEA similarly-situated requirement. An FLSA
claim that a number of low-level managers repeatedly misstated the
hours worked by employees seems somewhere in between.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
35. Id. §§ 201-19.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P 23(b)(3) Advisory Committee's Note (1966).
39. See, e.g., Troy v. Kehe Food Distribs., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 642,651 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
40. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554-57 (2011).
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There typically are two types of certification decisions in a collec-
tive action. The first is a tentative certification that merely permits no-
tice to the relevant group of workers advising them of the possibility of
opting into the collective action. The second and final certification re-
quires a conclusion that the new claimants are in fact similarly situ-
ated to the named plaintiffs. Defense attempts to invoke Dukes may
be accorded different treatment at these two distinct stages.
E. Statistical Evidence
The Dukes plaintiffs offered statistical evidence indicating that
both across the company as a whole and within each of the employer's
regions, on average, women were paid less and promoted less often
than men. The Court dismissed this as insufficient to raise an infer-
ence of widespread discrimination because "[a] regional pay disparity,
for example, may be attributed to only a small set of Wal-Mart stores,
and cannot by itself establish the uniform, store-by-store disparity
upon which the plaintiffs' theory of commonality depends."41 The
fact that women in a 100-store region made five percent less than com-
parable men might be a statistical fluke, derived solely from the fact
that at only ten stores women made only half as much as men. That
mere possibility, the Court insisted, was fatal to the statistical evi-
dence's probativeness. 42 The Court did not point to any defense evi-
dence that the disparities were in fact concentrated in "a small set" of
stores; rather, the Court reasoned, the statistics had to be rejected sim-
ply because it was possible to imagine some sort of an explanation.4 3
This method of evaluating (and dismissing) statistical evidence,
however, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court twenty-five
years ago in Bazemore v. Friday." The plaintiffs in Bazemore had of-
fered evidence that black employees who worked in the various county
offices of a state agency earned significantly less than comparable
white workers.4 5 The Fourth Circuit rejected that evidence, reasoning
that the disparities could have arisen simply because black workers
happened to be concentrated in counties where the salary levels
were lower.46 Bazemore held that the statistical evidence could not
be dismissed on that ground.47 A defendant or court could not rely
on mere speculation about the possibility of a benign (or less systemic)
explanation; rather, the Bazemore Court held, there had to be evidence
demonstrating that the exculpatory theory was actually true. Dukes
relies on precisely the sort of hypothetical explanation Bazemore
41. Id. at 2555 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 2554.
43. Id. at 2556.
44. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
45. Id. at 399.
46. Id. at 400-01.
47. Id. at 400.
United States Supreme Court's 2010-2011 Term
held legally insufficient. Lower courts will have to deal with the evi-
dent inconsistency between these two Supreme Court decisions.
F Anecdotal Evidence
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence was
insufficient "to raise any inference that all the individual, discretion-
ary personnel decisions [were] discriminatory."48 The opinion noted
that the plaintiffs' 120 affidavits detailing instances of discrimination
represented only "about 1 for every 12,500 class members,"49 and that
there were no affidavits regarding more than ninety percent of the
Wal-Mart stores. The opinion contrasted those anecdotes with the re-
cord in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,50
which contained anecdotal evidence from one of every eight class mem-
bers.5' The Court's analysis might mean only that the anecdotal evi-
dence in Dukes was insufficient by itself to meet the plaintiffs' burden.
It is, however, likely to lead to general attacks on the use of anecdotal
evidence unless the ratio of anecdotes to class members (or decisions)
reaches a particular numerical level. The broader reading is encour-
aged by a pointed footnote comment that "when the claim is that a com-
pany operates under a general policy of discrimination, a few anecdotes
selected from literally millions of employment decisions prove nothing
at all."5 2 On the other hand, any implication that proof of discrimina-
tion by one supervisor is irrelevant to claims of discrimination by an-
other supervisor would be inconsistent with the Court's 2008 decision
in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn.5 3 This aspect of the
Dukes opinion suggests that it may be important whether an anecdote
involved overt discrimination or discriminatory remarks. This is be-
cause incidents of the latter type reflect a (presumably well-informed)
conviction on the part of the discriminating supervisor that, under the
employer's actual policies, the official would not be punished for openly
engaging in such discrimination.
G. Daubert
Invoking a "social framework" analysis, the plaintiffs' sociology
expert testified that Wal-Mart had a "strong corporate culture that
makes it vulnerable to gender bias."54 In relying on that testimony,
the district court had concluded that the standards in Daubert v.
48. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
49. Id.
50. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
51. See id. at 331-32.
52. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 n.9.
53. 552 U.S. 379 (2008).
54. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (internal quotation marks omitted). For commentary
on social framework analysis, see Allan G. King & Syeeda S. Amin, The Propensity to
Stereotype as Inadmissible "Character" Evidence, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 23 (2011).
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.55 do "not apply to expert testimony
at the certification stage of class-action proceedings."56 The majority
opinion tersely commented, "[w]e doubt that is so .... "' This remark
leaves the lower courts in a quandary. Five members of the Supreme
Court have hinted at how they might resolve this issue, but gave no
explanation of either why they were inclined to do so or why they
had decided to stop short of an actual determination of the question.
In the final analysis, however, this question may prove of little practi-
cal importance. The purpose of Daubert is to prohibit a trial judge from
admitting for consideration by a jury purportedly scientific evidence
that lacks a substantial professionally recognized basis." But where
class certification is at issue, the judge applying Daubert will also be
responsible for determining the persuasiveness of that evidence. The
circumstances that would lead a judge under Daubert not to admit dis-
puted scientific evidence would in any event convince that same judge
that the evidence was unpersuasive.
H. Significance of an Employer's Written
Anti-Discrimination Policy
In one provocative passage, the Court expressed surprising cer-
tainty that the existence of a written rule forbidding discrimination
will prevent any substantial amount of discrimination in the absence
of some covert, centralized policy encouraging discrimination. "[Lieft
to their own devices, most managers in any corporation-and surely
most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all."59
Virtually all corporations of any size, of course, have such formal
anti-discrimination policies. This portion of the opinion invites defen-
dants to point to such policies, both in opposing class certification and
in seeking summary judgment, as assertedly weighty evidence that lit-
tle discrimination could have occurred. Plaintiffs, of course, can point
out that this passage is on its face limited to cases in which managers
are "left to their own devices,"60 and assert that a pattern of discrimi-
nation was the result of some controlling, albeit hidden, policy.
L Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)
For forty years, employment class actions have been certified
under Rule 23(b)(2). Although the appropriateness of a Rule 23(b)(2)
55. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
56. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
57. Id.
58. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
59. Id. at 2554.
60. Id.
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class turns on whether final injunctive relief is appropriate,61 lower
courts generally believed that monetary relief could be awarded in
such cases so long as the monetary awards were "incidental" to the in-
junctive relief Dukes unanimously rejected that interpretation of Rule
23(b)(2), 62 holding that where there will need to be individualized de-
terminations of the amount of monetary relief, a class action can only
be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). 63
Rule 23(b)(3) certification requires a finding "that the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members."" The impact of this aspect of
Dukes will turn on how the lower courts now construe the term "pre-
dominate." 65 There are at least three different meanings that could
be given to the predominance requirement.
First, it might be construed to refer simply to the number of
questions-whether there are more questions common to the class
than there are questions applicable only to particular individuals. Em-
ployment discrimination classes would almost never meet that stan-
dard because there would typically be only a few common questions
(e.g., was there a pattern or practice of discrimination?), but at least
as many individual questions as there are class members (e.g., was
the class member a victim of discrimination? How much was the
class member injured? Did the class member mitigate damages?).
Second, "predominates" could also be understood to refer to how
much time would be needed to try all the factual issues, if, in fact,
every one of those issues proceeded to trial. That would bar many em-
ployment discrimination class actions because the time needed to try
the common question or questions (typically a few weeks) would usually
be much less than the aggregate time needed to try every individual's
claim (perhaps a few days for each class member).
The third possibility, under which class actions might continue
without major changes, is that "predominates" would be construed
as referring to what is likely to occur if the case actually were litigated.
Decades of employment class actions illustrate that once there is a
finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination (or a finding that a
test or job requirement had an unlawful disparate impact), it is vir-
tually unheard of for a defendant actually to insist on individual hear-
ings. The existing evidence of systemic discrimination, together with
the burden of proof shift, make it highly likely that an employer
61. See FED. R. COv. P. 23(b)(3).
62. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
63. Id. at 2558.
64. FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b)(3).
65. The same term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) regarding supplemental
jurisdiction; it remains to be seen whether that will become important.
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would lose most such individual hearings. In the few cases where em-
ployers have insisted on such hearings, the results have generally
been disastrous for them as they have lost the overwhelming majority
of those individual hearings, incurred large legal bills, and increased
the ultimate cost of settling the case.
If a court anticipates, as will be true in most cases, that a finding
of class-wide discrimination will be followed by a settlement, it could
conclude that the common issues would predominate both in terms
of the amount of discovery and the actual trial litigation. That possibi-
lity, of course, may lead defense counsel to insist at the certification
hearing that they intend, if a pattern or practice is found, to try
every single class member's case. A trial judge, however, might regard
that sort of representation with a degree of skepticism. If the class
were certified and there were a finding of a pattern or practice of dis-
crimination, the defense attorney who made that representation could
be in a very difficult position because the lawyer's credibility with the
judge would be damaged if the client then wanted to settle rather than
spend large sums to litigate individual claims.
Under Rule 23(b)(3), when a class is certified, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) re-
quires class members be given notice (paid for by plaintiffs) and an
opportunity to opt out of the class. There will probably be few class ac-
tions in which the plaintiffs' attorney is unable to pay for the notice; a
lawyer who cannot afford a dollar per class member probably lacks the
resources to handle the class action effectively. Whether class mem-
bers choose to opt out is likely to turn on the content of the notice;
the parties will presumably argue, for example, over whether the no-
tice should warn putative class members of how little time they
would have to file suit on their own if they opted out. In many -class
actions, plaintiffs' counsel is anxious to make contact with class mem-
bers who may be potential witnesses. That may lead to disputes about
whether the notice should invite class members to contact class coun-
sel and whether plaintiffs' counsel would be given the names and con-
tact information for all class members, both of which defendants may
oppose.
J Mandatory Individualized Hearings
In Dukes, the Court unanimously held that even when there is a
proven pattern or practice of intentional discrimination, a defendant
is entitled to a hearing as to whether any particular individual class
member was a victim of discrimination, and as to the amount of mone-
tary relief (or type of injunctive relief) warranted."6 The Court rejected
66. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
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the lower courts' proposal for what the Supreme Court termed a "Trial
by Formula."6 7 In the context of Dukes, such a requirement was fatal;
the plaintiffs had never suggested that they could possibly try over a
million individual cases.
Even prior to Dukes, however, there was no established practice of
denying defendants such hearings primarily because they rarely
asked for them. It seldom made sense for defendants to try a signifi-
cant number of such individual claims; if individual discovery and
hearings were seriously litigated, the defendants were likely to fare
poorly. However, in cases in which (as in Dukes itself) the plaintiffs' at-
torneys clearly lack the resources to try many individual claims, it
could make sense for defendants to bluff and insist on such hearings.
Dukes reminds defendants that they can demand such hearings, but
does not change the economics of the situation. It may, however,
have the effect of inviting defendants to engage in a war of attrition,
requesting a large number of individualized hearings, even if it loses
all of them, until the cost of litigating those hearings causes the plain-
tiffs' attorney (unable for the time being to collect the counsel fees it
has earned) to run out of funds.
In many disparate-impact cases, individualized monetary relief
hearings would not be appropriate. Where an employer has used a
test held to have an unlawful disparate impact, it may be possible to
ascertain the number of individuals who would have been hired or pro-
moted if the test had no disparate impact, but it is often impossible to
identify which particular applicants or employees would have been
hired or promoted if another test had been used. In those cases, the
total amount of back pay may be calculable, and the sum is typically
divided equally among the class members or some portion of the
class. In addition, a summary judgment motion regarding a particular
claim might defeat an employer's request for an individualized hear-
ing. For example, in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,68 there may well have
been no genuine issue about which individuals were entitled to mone-
tary relief.69
67. Id. Justice Scalia noted that this method would consist of the following:
A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for
sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in
depositions supervised by a master. The percentage of claims determined to
be valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number
of (presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the aver-
age backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery-
without further individualized proceedings.
68. 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011); see discussion infra Part VC.
69. Id.
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III. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP"o
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP presented a recurring
problem in employment law: an employer that retaliates against one
worker by dismissing another closely connected employee, usually a
family member.71 At the time of the events giving rise to the suit,
the plaintiff, Eric Thompson, was engaged to a co-worker, Miriam Re-
galado, who filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).72 Shortly after Regalado filed that
charge, the employer dismissed Thompson.73 A sharply divided Sixth
Circuit held that Thompson could not sue. 7 4 The lower courts had gen-
erally held that such a dismissed worker could not obtain relief under
Title VII. 75 But in Thompson, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
ruled that Title VII authorizes relief in this situation. 7 6
In sustaining Thompson's claim, the Supreme Court reformulated
the issue in a critical way. The lower courts had framed the question as
whether such a dismissal would violate the rights of the terminated
worker, here Thompson, and concluded that no such violation had oc-
curred because the dismissed employee had not engaged in any pro-
tected activity. The Supreme Court instead saw the case as presenting
two different issues: (1) whether the dismissal violated the rights
of the individual who had engaged in protected activity, and (2) whether
the dismissed worker could maintain an action to redress injuries suf-
fered as a result of this violation of the rights of the other worker."
A. Illegality of Reprisals Against Third Parties
The Court readily concluded, as counsel for the employer ulti-
mately conceded, that such a retaliatory dismissal indeed violated
the rights of the worker who had engaged in protected activity, Rega-
lado, even though she herself had not been fired.78 The Court utilized
the standard in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White,79 which held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII for-
bids any retaliatory employer action that "well might have 'dissuaded
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimi-
nation.'"80 Applying that standard, the Thompson Court held, "[wle
think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from
70. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 867.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir.1998).
76. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
77. Id. at 868-70.
78. See id.
79. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
80. Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fianc6 would be
fired."8
The Supreme Court declined to adopt a more specific rule beyond
the general standard in Burlington Northern regarding what type of
relationship between the two workers would be required to establish
a violation. 82 In doing so, it stated, "[wle expect that firing a close fa-
mily member will almost always meet the Burlington standard, and
inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never
do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize."83
As a practical matter, this issue may not often be disputed. Almost
all of the reported cases involving this problem have concerned dismis-
sals of family members. An employer that wanted to punish a worker
for protected activity would not bother to take action against a co-
worker unless there was a sufficiently clear connection between the
two workers so that the punitive message would be clear to the worker
who had actually engaged in the protected activity (and to others as
well).
The Burlington Northern standard has been applied by the lower
courts to retaliation claims under a wide variety of statutes other than
Title VII (as well as to constitutional claims), so this sort of third-party
reprisal will in all likelihood be held unlawful under almost all other
laws.84
B. Third-Party Standing
The more difficult question in Thompson was whether Thompson
could bring a lawsuit because he was injured by a violation, not of his
own rights, but of Regalado's rights. Under the principle of jus tertii
(not mentioned in the opinion, but clearly at issue), an individual can-
not ordinarily maintain an action to redress injuries caused by a viola-
tion of the rights of another party. A person asserting an injury caused
by the violation of someone else's rights usually lacks standing.85 This,
however, is only a judicially created prudential standing requirement,
not the constitutionally mandated Article III standing requirement.
Congress can create third-party standing and authorize such suits
by statute.
The Thompson Court held that congressional authorization for
such third-party lawsuits was contained in Title VII section 706(f)
(1), which authorizes "a civil action . .. by the person claiming to be
81. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., McInnis v. Town of Weston, 458 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Conn. 2008) (Bur-
lington Northern applied to ADEA claim).
85. This limitation does not apply to claims by the government on behalf of indivi-
duals; thus, the EEOC could have maintained the action in Thompson even if section 706
(f)(1) did not authorize Thompson himself to sue.
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aggrieved." 86 The Court concluded that the phrase "person . . . ag-
grieved" in Title VII has the same meaning as the identical phrase
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)8 7 section 702. Under the
APA standard, a person is aggrieved if the individual "falls within
the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision
whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint."88 Applying
that standard, the Court concluded that:
[Aiccepting the facts as alleged, Thompson is not an accidental vic-
tim of the retaliation-collateral damage, so to speak of the employ-
er's unlawful act. To the contrary, injuring him was the employer's
intended means of harming Regalado. Hurting him was the unlawful
act by which the employer punished her. In those circumstances,
we think Thompson well within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by Title VII.89
Given this reasoning, any person subject to adverse action as a "means
of harming" someone else would be a "person aggrieved."
The applicability of Thompson's standard of third-party standing
to other laws will turn on and require an analysis of the particular
statutory language authorizing suit. A number of statutes, in terms
similar to Title VII and the APA, authorize suit by a person or party "ag-
grieved."90 That phrase presumably will be given the same interpreta-
tion as in Thompson.91 Several statutes, such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,
allow for enforcement under Title VII itself, including section 706.92
Thompson should be controlling here.
Thompson will likely be applied as well to FLSA section 16(b),93
which provides that an employer is liable "to the employee or employ-
ees affected" by a violation of the Act.9 4 A worker dismissed to punish
another worker would obviously be "affected" by that retaliatory act.
There is thus a strong argument that the FLSA authorizes suits by
third-party victims. The Equal Pay Act,95 in turn, utilizes the enforce-
ment provisions of the FLSA. The Immigration Control and Reform Act
(ICRA) section 1324b(b)(1) authorizes the filing of an administrative
charge by "any person alleging that the person is adversely affected
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
87. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006).
88. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871, 883 (1990)).
89. Id.
90. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2006) (ADEA); id. § 633a(c) (ADEA age discrimina-
tion claims by federal employees).
91. See Dembin v. LVI Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1888 (JSR), 2011 WL 5374148, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2011).
92. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006).
94. Id. § 216(b).
95. Id. § 206(d).
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directly by an unfair immigration-related employment practice," which
would include violations of the anti-retaliation provisions of ICRA sec-
tion 1324b(a)(5). 96 A third-party dismissal victim, such as Thompson,
would clearly be "adversely affected." Section 1983 provides that a per-
son who deprives any person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."97 This, on its face, authorizes a suit by any person injured,
and it is not limited to the particular person who was deprived, for
example, of a constitutional right.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 8 poses a more diffi-
cult question. Section 107(a)(2) provides that an action against an
employer may be maintained by "one or more employees," but section
107(a)(1) provides that an employer that violates section 105 shall be
liable only to "any eligible employee affected."99 Section 101(2) defines
"eligible employee" to mean "an employee who has been employed ...
for at least 12 months ... and [has] at least 1,250 hours of service with
[the] employer during the previous 12-month period."100 The provision
authorizing the Secretary of Labor to seek monetary relief for indivi-
duals is similarly limited to payments "due to eligible employees,"
although actions by the Secretary for equitable relief do not have a simi-
lar restriction.10' This suggests, at best, that a third-party victim could
only bring a successful lawsuit if the victim were an "eligible employee."
Several statutes have only an implied cause of action, including
Title VI, Title IX, and section 1981. It will be even more difficult to es-
tablish third-party standing under these statutes because there is no
specific statutory language that could be said expressly to authorize
suit by third-party victims.
For other statutes, it will be significant if, in the circuit in ques-
tion, a previous interpretation has been based in part on the estab-
lished construction of Title VII.10 2 Because the third-party standing
doctrine is essentially a federal rule of statutory interpretation,
whether a state statute authorizes third-party claims would turn on
state law, even if the claim arose in federal court. A number of lower
court cases have presented a distinct but related question, whether
white (or male) workers can sue if they are injured by a practice
that discriminates against non-whites (or women). That would arise,
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(1) (2006).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006)
99. Id. § 2617(a)(1)-(2).
100. Id. § 2611(2)(A).
101. See id. § 2617(d)(1).
102. E.g., EEOC v. Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., No. CV 09-690-PK, 2011 WL
886402, at *10 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2011) (retaliation claims under Oregon statute "are ana-
lyzed under the same framework as Title VII retaliation claims").
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for example, if an employer discriminated against a group of people (an
entire department, for example) because most of its workers were
women.103
IV. Staub v. Proctor Hospital 0 4
In Staub, the Supreme Court addressed what is known as the
"cat's paw" theory of discrimination. 0 5 This deals with the extent of
employer liability when a biased official (typically a supervisor) influ-
enced the decision of another official (typically a higher ranking super-
visor or a human resources official), who took an adverse action
against the plaintiff. In this common scenario, the latter official, often
referred to as the "ultimate decisionmaker," does not have an unlawful
motive. Employers have argued that they should not be held liable so
long as the ultimate decisionmaker acted for lawful purposes, and that
the motives of the biased official are thus legally irrelevant.
Prior to Staub, lower courts had been divided on separate issues
raised by this situation. 06 First, the courts of appeals have utilized
three distinct general standards, holding variously that the employer
is liable only if the biased official: (a) influenced the ultimate decision-
maker; (b) caused the adverse action; or (c) in some sense exercised de
facto control over the decisionmaker. The latter formulation, in the
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, required a showing
that the biased official exercise "singular influence" over the ultimate
decisionmaker, or that the ultimate decisionmaker was a cat's paw
(i.e., a witless dupe) of the biased official.' 07 Second, many courts of
103. The Second Circuit sustained such a claim in Anjelino v. New York Times Co.,
200 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 2000); more recently, the district court in Ferrell v. Johnson, No. 4:09-
cv-40, 2011 WL 1225907, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2011), assumed that such a claim
would be viable.
104. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
105. For further discussion on this theory, see Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig,
Within Grasp of the Cat's Paw: Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability
Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REv. 383 (2008).
Judge Posner ... coined the term "cat's paw" liability to refer to employer lia-
bility resulting from subordinate bias. The term derives from the fable of the
monkey and the cat by Jean de La Fontaine. The fable tells the tale of a con-
niving monkey that wants to eat chestnuts roasting in a fire. The monkey is
unwilling to burn himself to get the chestnuts and instead convinces a cat to
do his bidding. As the cat repeatedly burns its paws retrieving the chestnuts
from the fire, the monkey sits back unharmed, devouring the chestnuts. The
modern connotation of "cat's-paw" refers to "one used by another to accom-
plish his purposes." In the employment context, the monkey represents the
biased subordinate, while the cat represents the employer who acts as the
conduit to commit discriminatory adverse actions against the victimized
employee.
Id. at 385 (internal citations omitted).
106. See id. at 386.
107. See, e.g., Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir.
2007).
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appeals had held that an employer could avoid liability if the ultimate
decisionmaker had conducted some sort of "independent investiga-
tion," although the lower courts had divergent views about what con-
stituted such an exculpatory independent investigation. 108
Staub arose under the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-
employment Right Act (USERRA). 09 The plaintiff alleged he had
been fired because of his service in the U.S. Army Reserve. The case
was tried under the Seventh Circuit's singular influence standard,
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.110 On appeal, the Se-
venth Circuit held that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate
the existence of the requisite singular influence.1 1 ' The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that an employer is immune from liability so long as the ul-
timate decisionmaker relied in part on any information that came from
someone other than the biased official. The Supreme Court unani-
mously overturned the Seventh Circuit decision. Justice Scalia's ma-
jority opinion established a new standard for resolving these cases,
holding "if a supervisor performs an act motivated by [unlawful] ani-
mus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employ-
ment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate em-
ployment action, then the employer is liable . . . . "112 Under Staub,
a plaintiff must establish four elements: agency, discriminatory mo-
tive, an intent to cause the adverse action in question, and proximate
causation.
A. Agency Standards
The core theory of the majority opinion is that an employer's liabi-
lity in this situation is governed by agency law. A plaintiff must estab-
lish that the biased official was (under traditional standards of agency
law) acting as an agent of the employer when the official took the
action that was connected to the subsequent dismissal or other adverse
action.
Citing Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, the Court held an
employer is responsible for the actions of an employee if the worker
was acting within the scope of employment or if liability would for
some other reason "be imputed to the employer under traditional
agency principles."" The cited portion of Ellerth notes that liability
108. See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476,
488 (10th Cir. 2006).
109. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-35 (2006).
110. The Seventh Circuit's singular influence standard allows "liability for an em-
ployment decision [to] be imputed to the employer only if a biased employee had a sin-
gular influence over the ultimate decisionmaker." Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi. Park
Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2011).
111. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009).
112. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct 1186, 1194 (2011) (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 1194 n.4 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758
(1998)).
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may also be imputed to an employer if the biased official's action was
"aided" by the official's position. 114 Staub noted, for example, that "[a]
'reprimand ... for workplace failings' constitutes conduct within the
scope of an agent's employment."11 5 The vast majority of the cases rais-
ing this issue have involved a biased supervisor engaging in some tra-
ditional supervisory function. In light of Staub, however, it will be im-
portant for litigants to address whether a supervisor's conduct (e.g.,
providing information to higher officials) was within the scope of em-
ployment, or was "aided" by the supervisor's position.
The opinion in Staub expressly took no position regarding
whether (or when) an employer could be held liable based on a discri-
minatory act by a co-worker that led to the ultimate decision.116 There
could be circumstances in which the actions of a co-worker would be
within the scope of employment (e.g., the co-worker had an obligation
to report certain misconduct) or in which the co-worker's position fa-
cilitated the discriminatory action. Cases raising this issue, however,
appear to be fairly uncommon.
Because Staub is based on the general principles of agency law,
which are generally presumed to govern interpretation of federal sta-
tutes, the decision is likely to be applied to other federal employment
statutes. Constitutional claims, however, present two distinct issues.
The first issue is whether Staub will govern the question of whether
a constitutional violation has occurred at all. There is a good chance
courts will conclude that Staub does control this issue. For example,
if a government supervisor, acting for an unconstitutional purpose,
causes another supervisor to dismiss an employee, a constitutional vio-
lation finding would be consistent with existing state action stan-
dards." 7 The second issue is whether Staub will control whether a
city or county (in addition to the official who acted with an unconstitu-
tional motive) is liable. That seems less likely, because municipal
liability in section 1983 cases is not governed by traditional agency
principles."18
114. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 744, 758.
115. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 798-99 (1993)).
116. Id. at 1194 n.4 ("We express no view as to whether the employer would be li-
able if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influ-
enced the ultimate employment decision.").
117. See Devore v. Cheney Univ. of Pa., No. 11-274, 2012 WL 10322, at *15 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 3, 2012).
118. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Nagle v.
Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 117 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting but not resolving applicability of
Staub to municipal liability); Manuele v. City of Jennings, No. 4:10-CV-1655-JAR,
2012 WL 113538, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2012) (Staub not applicable); Teal v. City of
Dahlonega, No. 2:09-CV-0187-RWS, 2012 WL 95555, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2012)
(Staub not applicable).
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B. Intent to Cause the Adverse Action
Intent is a new element not previously utilized by lower courts.
The Supreme Court apparently requires"x9 the plaintiff to establish
that the biased official actually intended 2 0 to cause the particular
adverse action.121
In holding that the record contained sufficient evidence of this ele-
ment, the Court pointed to three things. First, one biased official sta-
ted she was trying to "get rid of" Staub, and others knew that the offi-
cial was "out to get" him.122 "Out to get" is a fairly general statement of
malevolent intent, but the Court found it sufficient to justify an infer-
ence that the speaker wanted Staub dismissed. Second, a biased em-
ployee supervisor directed his adverse report about Staub to an official
"responsible for terminating employees," and that official "fired Staub
immediately."123 Third, there was "no evidence that [the biased super-
visors] intended any particular adverse action other than Staub's ter-
mination."12 4 Although the "get rid of" comment is not common in
these cases,125 the second and third types of evidence are routine.
C. Proximate Cause
The Court's opinion explains that ordinarily the act of a biased
supervisor will be the proximate cause of the adverse action if there
is a direct relationship between the two, and that a showing of proxi-
mate cause is not defeated by the separate, intervening act of the ulti-
mate decisionmaker. Specifically, the Court held:
[Tihe exercise of judgment by the [ultimate] decisionmaker does not
prevent the earlier agent's action ... from being the proximate cause
of the harm. . . . The decisionmaker's exercise of judgment is also a
proximate cause of the employment decision, but it is common for in-
juries to have multiple proximate causes. Nor can the ultimate deci-
sionmaker's judgment be deemed a superseding cause of the harm.
119. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 n.2 (leaving open the question of whether the em-
ployer might be liable even though the discriminatory act caused an adverse action dif-
ferent from that intended by the biased official).
120. Id. at 1194 n.3 ("Under traditional tort law, 'intnt. .. denote[s] that the actor
desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.'") (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) TORTs § 8A (1965)).
121. Id. at 1192 ("Animus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be at-
tributed to the earlier agent ... if the adverse action is the intended consequence of that
[biased] agent's discriminatory conduct. So long as the agent intends, for discriminatory
reasons, that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be liable under
USERRA."); id. at 1193 (acts "that were designed and intended to produce the averse ac-
tion") (emphasis in original); id. at 1194 (act of biased supervisor that "is intended by the
supervisor to cause an adverse employment action") (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 1194.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1192 n.2.
125. But see Kurth v. City of Inkster, No. 10-11973, 2011 WL 6371085, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 20, 2011).
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A cause can be thought "superseding" only if it is a "cause of indepen-
dent origin that was not foreseeable." 26
These limitations on what could constitute a superseding cause are
significant.127
The Court's opinion points to several types of biased supervisor
acts as examples of conduct that would be a proximate cause of an ad-
verse action, such as an "unfavorable entry on the plaintiff's personnel
record"; a "biased report," "performance assessment[ I," or "recommen-
dation" "inform[ing" other officials about the plaintiff's asserted mis-
conduct; and a "reprimand . . . for workplace failings."12 8 The peti-
tioner's brief summarizes lower court decisions in an appendix that
illustrates other ways in which actions by biased supervisors have
led to adverse action against a plaintiff.12 9 The two most common dis-
criminatory acts resulting in adverse actions are giving inaccurate in-
formation to other officials and withholding important exculpatory
information. 130
D. Proof of Causation
Staub defines the allocation of the burden of proof regarding cau-
sation. In this regard, the opinion is based in part on the terms of
USERRA, and thus might not apply to claims under other statutes,
particularly the ADEA. The burden on the plaintiff, the Court repeat-
edly states, is to show that the unlawfully motivated act of the biased
supervisor was a "causal factor of the ultimate employment action."' 3 '
An employer will be liable unless "the employer's investigation results
in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original
biased action [and] by the terms of USERRA it is the employer's bur-
den to establish that . . ."132
126. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
127. The relevant provisions of the Restatement of Torts are summarized in the
brief for petitioner. Brief for Petitioner, Staub, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400),
2010 WL 2690585.
128. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191-94 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 127.
130. For examples of the types of actions by biased officials that were held suffi-
cient in post-Staub decisions, see the following: Ley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d
864, 873 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (biased supervisor's inaccurate information led to plaintiff's
termination); Ridley v. Harris Cnty., No. H-09-1867, 2011 WL 1485661, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 19, 2011) (biased supervisor's negative evaluation cost plaintiff promotion);
Memon v. Deloitte Consulting, LLP, 779 F. Supp. 2d 619, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (biased
supervisor's negative performance evaluation led to plaintiff's termination); but see Or-
dogne v. AAA Tex., LLC, No. H-09-1872, 2011 WL 3438466, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011)
(biased supervisor's report did not influence plaintiffs termination because decision-
makers "independently" justified termination "entirely apart from [biased supervisor's]
report").
131. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193; see also id. ("a causal factor"); id. at 1194 ("causal
factors").
132. Id. at 1193.
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USERRA, like Title VII, provides that when a plaintiff shows that
an unlawful purpose was "a motivating factor," the burden shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of that impermissible factor.133 The evident meaning of
Staub is that in a USERRA case (and, presumably, in a case under
any statute with a similar allocation of the burden of proof), the plain-
tiff need only show that the discriminatory conduct was a causal factor,
and the burden would be on the employer to show that that conduct
was nonetheless not a but-for cause. In a case under the ADEA, how-
ever, because of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,134 it seems
likely that the burden would be on the plaintiff to show that the discri-
minatory action was a but-for cause of the adverse action. 35
E. Independent Investigations
Staub expressly rejected the independent investigation defense
that had previously been accepted by many lower courts.' 3 6 The Court
stated, "we are aware of no principle in tort or agency law under which
an employer's mere conduct of an independent investigation has a
claim-preclusive effect. Nor do we think the independent investigation
somehow relieves the employer of 'fault.' "'3
Thus, even if an independent investigation (however defined) oc-
curred, a supervisor's biased report may remain a causal factor if
the independent investigation takes it into account without determin-
ing that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor's recom-
mendation, entirely justified.13 8
V. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.' 3 9
Kasten concerned the construction of the FLSA anti-retaliation
provision, section 215(a)(3), which forbids an employer from discrimi-
nating against an employee because the employee has "filed any com-
plaint . . . under or related to [the Act.]"14 0 In Kasten, the plaintiff
complained to company officials that the timeclock location forced em-
ployees to don and doff work-related protective gear without being
133. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (2006).
134. 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (rejecting mixed-motive theory for ADEA claims).
135. In comparison to the pre-Staub lower court standards, this is essentially a
rule adopting the "influence" standard under statutes like USERRA and Title VII, and
the "cause" standard under the ADEA.
136. See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476,
488 (10th Cir. 2006).
137. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193.
138. Id. Indeed, the district court in Chisholm v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering relied
on Staub in excluding as irrelevant a defendant's evidence that it had conducted an in-
dependent investigation of its own actions. No. 09 Civ. 8211 (VM), 2011 WL 2015526,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011).
139. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
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compensated. 141 Kasten was fired and he sued asserting he was termi-
nated for orally complaining about the timeclock location. The Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision that Kasten's oral complaint
was not protected and held that FLSA section 215(a)(3) applies to
oral as well as written complaints.142
A. Method of Statutory Interpretation
Kasten may prove to be of broad importance because of the meth-
odology the Court used in construing section 215(a)(3). The court of ap-
peals, assuming that the term "filed" must have some specific mean-
ing, concluded that "filed" meant filed in writing, and insisted it was
compelled to apply that "plain language" even though the result
seemed inconsistent with the statute's purpose.143 The Supreme Court,
rather than assuming that every word (or phrase) must have a single
specific plain language meaning, recognized that a word (or phrase)
might have several alternative meanings. Where that is the case,
Kasten held, the language itself simply delineates the permissible
possible interpretations. A court must then select from among those al-
ternatives the construction that best advances the purpose of the stat-
utory provision and the law as a whole.144 The statutory purpose is
irrelevant only when "the text, taken alone, . . . provide [s] a conclusive
answer to our interpretive question."145
Kasten recognizes that words often have a range of different
meanings and that the most common usage of a particular word is not
the only possible, or necessary, meaning. The burden on the plaintiff
in Kasten thus was not to prove that "file a complaint" must mean "file
a written or oral complaint," but only to show that the phrase could
have such a meaning. After noting that one dictionary defined "file" in
a manner broad enough to include an oral complaint, the Court ex-
plained, "[t]his possibility is significant because it means that diction-
ary meanings, even if considered alone, do not necessarily limit the
scope of the statutory phrase to written complaints."146
Kasten illustrates a range of ways of demonstrating the possible
meanings of a term. One, of course, is dictionaries. There are scores
of English-language dictionaries, and their definitions of the same
word may vary widely. In the case of "file," most dictionaries have a
definition that seems to refer to a written document, but the Court's
ability to find even a single dictionary with a broader definition was
141. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1327.
142. Id. at 1336.
143. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840
(7th Cir. 2009).
144. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1330-33.
145. Id. at 1333 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1331 (text itself does not "neces-
sarily" preclude protection of oral complaints).
146. Id. at 1331 (citation omitted).
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sufficient to demonstrate that the term could refer to an oral com-
plaint.147 Resorting to a library with a good collection of dictionaries
may prove important in future cases. The Court also pointed to in-
stances in which statutes, opinions, or regulations used the term "file"
to refer to an oral complaint or statement.148 In addition, thoughtful
consideration of common usage of a term or phrase (possibly with an
illustration gleaned from a Google search) may be helpful. Both Kasten
and the Court's earlier decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Govern-
ment of Nashvillel 49 illustrate how words may have in common
usage a range of meanings that simply are not captured in dictionary
definitions.
B. The Content of a Protected Complaint
To be protected by FLSA section 215(a)(3), an oral complaint must
"put the employer on notice that [the] employee is asserting statutory
rights under the [Act.]"' 50 More specifically, the Court explained that
"a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable
employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as
an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their
protection."11
This standard has two elements. First, the standard (particularly
the longer articulation) does not call for an actual reference to the
FLSA; rather, it requires that the employee's complaint be about some-
thing the FLSA forbids, such as not being paid overtime (as opposed to,
for example, a general gripe that "I don't make much money"). Second,
the standard requires that the complaint indicate that the speaker (or
writer) wants something to be done about the circumstances described.
That seems less likely to be an issue, and appears at least similar to
the standard for determining when a written statement to the EEOC
constitutes a "charge" under Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki.152
[Ilt must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take
remedial action. . . [The filing must be examined from the stand-
point of an objective observer to determine whether, by a reasonable
construction of its terms, the filer requests the agency to activate its
machinery and remedial processes ... 153
147. Id. at 1331.
148. See id. at 1331-32.
149. 555 U.S. 271, 277-78 (2009) (an employee can "oppose" discrimination in the
workplace, and, thus, come under the protection of the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII, by responding to someone else's question about the discrimination, just as surely as
by provoking the discussion).
150. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335 (alterations in original).
151. Id.; see also id. at 1334 ("[A] 'filing' is a serious occasion, rather than a trivi-
ality."). The same standard applies to written as well as oral complaints.
152. 552 U.S. 389 (2008).
153. Id. at 402.
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It seems likely that, in this respect, decisions under Holowecki will be
relied on in cases under Kasten and vice versa.
C. Protection of Internal Complaints
Kasten expressly did not resolve a distinct important question
under the FLSA: whether section 215(a)(3) applies to an internal com-
plaint, written or oral, made to an employer rather than to the federal
government. 1 5 4 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, addressed
that issue and concluded that with respect to the FLSA, "filed a com-
plaint" means filed a complaint with the government.15 5
There is a circuit split on this issue, and it seems likely that the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari to resolve the matter when the
question is presented by a suitable case. At this point, only the Second
Circuit has held that "filed a complaint" refers solely to a complaint
made to federal officials.156 Nine other circuits have concluded that
the statute applies to an internal complaint to an employer.157 Most re-
cently, the Fourth Circuit, relying in part on portions of the analysis in
Kasten, held that section 215(a)(3) does protect internal complaints.' 58
D. The Kasten "Weight" Doctrine
The Court in Kasten also "[gave] a degree of weight to" the inter-
pretation of the statute advanced by the Department of Labor (which
enforces the FLSA) and the EEOC (which enforces the Equal Pay Act,
which encompasses the anti-retaliation provision in the FLSA).1 59
The Court referred to two considerations in holding that the views
of the agencies were entitled to a "degree of weight." First, the Court
noted that the agencies' construction of the statute had existed for
some time. The Department of Labor had advanced its interpretation
in a lawsuit decided in 1961 and in a brief filed in 1996.160 The Depart-
ment's view was also demonstrated, the Court believed, by the Depart-
ment's action in establishing "a hotline to receive oral complaints."161
Reliance on an agency's practices as reflecting its presumed view of the
154. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336.
155. Id. at 1337-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993).
157. See, e.g., Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., No. 10-1258, 2012 WL 251926, at *13
(4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2012); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir.
2008); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003-05 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Valerio v.
Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Schs.,
976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006,
1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1987); Love v.
RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha,
Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
158. Minor, 2012 WL 251926, at *13.
159. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335; see also id. (finding that the agency positions "add
force to our conclusion[s].").
160. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335.
161. Id.
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law expands the significance of this line of analysis. The EEOC posi-
tion had been included in a 1998 Compliance Manual and briefs filed
in 1988 and 1996.162 The Court explained that "[t]he length of time
the agencies have held [those views] suggests that they reflect careful
consideration, not 'post hoc rationalizatio[n].' "163 Second, the Court
noted that the "agency views are reasonable" and "consistent with
the Act."164 This appears to be a relatively undemanding element.
What may be emerging here is the idea that under certain circum-
stances, the position of the agency responsible for enforcing or adminis-
tering a statute, although not entitled to "deference," should be accorded
"weight." This holding is not the traditional Skidmore deference;165
the "weight" is not based on "the power to persuade" in the agencies'
positions, the touchstone of Skidmore deference, but on having been
consistently advanced for a significant period of time. The impact of
Kasten weight is less than Chevron166 or Auer' 67 deference-it is not
conclusive whenever reasonable-but more than the significance af-
forded an agency position under Skidmore.168 This gives added force
to the well-established positions of the EEOC and Secretary of Labor
regarding a wide range of other employment law issues.
The Kasten weight doctrine finds additional support in the Court's
decision in New Process Steel, L.P v. NLRB.169 In holding that the
NLRB could not take action when it had only two members, the
Court relied in part on the fact that, until recently, the Board's practice
had been to insist that any Board panel have three members whose
terms had not expired. 70
The potential importance of the Kasten weight doctrine is illu-
strated by the Federal Circuit's decision in Dell Products L.P. v. United
States.'7' The question in that case was how certain computer bat-
teries should be classified for the purpose of determining the applic-
able import tariff.17 2 The U.S. Customs Service had addressed the
same type of issue in a slightly different context (computer speakers)
in rulings in 2001 and 2008 and had been "consistent in its applica-
tion" of the provision involved.i73 Relying on Kasten, the Federal
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)).
164. Id. at 1335.
165. Skidmore v. Swift, & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
166. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
167. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1997).
168. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
169. 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
170. Id. at 2641-42 ("Tihe Board's longstanding practice is persuasive evidence
that it is the correct one . . . . ").
171. 642 F.3d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
172. Id. at 1056-57.
173. Id. at 1060.
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Circuit concluded that under those circumstances, "[t]he consistency of
Customs' interpretation of [the tariff] enhances the persuasive power
of that interpretation."' 74
VI. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.
Whiting17 5
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, the
Court rejected a challenge to the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007,
which requires Arizona courts, in certain circumstances, to suspend
or revoke the business license (including any certificate of incorpora-
tion) of an employer that twice knowingly or intentionally employed
an unauthorized alien.176 The Chamber of Commerce of the United
States and a number of business and civil rights organizations chal-
lenged the statute, arguing that the legislation was preempted on sev-
eral grounds by federal immigration laws.17 7 The Supreme Court held
that the Arizona law was not expressly preempted17 8 by a federal sta-
tute that precludes the states from imposing "civil or criminal sanc-
tions" on employers that employ unauthorized aliens, "other than
through licensing laws." 79 Ordinary business licenses, and even certi-
ficates of incorporation, the Court held, are within the scope of the "li-
censing laws" exception.180
The Arizona statute also required employers to use the federal
E-Verify system to confirm that their workers and job applicants
were legally entitled to work.' 8 ' The plaintiffs argued that this was in-
consistent with the federal statute that forbade the Secretary of Home-
land Security, in the absence of a prior violation of federal immigration
law, to require employers to use the E-Verify system.18 2 That prohibi-
tion, the Court held, did not preclude a state from imposing on employ-
ers the requirement that the Secretary of Homeland Security was for-
bidden to impose.183
A four-member plurality also rejected arguments that federal im-
migration law impliedly preempted the Arizona statute.184 The plain-
tiffs contended that the state law would upset the balance that Con-
gress sought to strike when it enacted the Immigration Reform and
174. Id.
175. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
176. Id. at 1970-71.
177. Id. at 1971.
178. Id. at 1981.
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (h)(2) (2006).
180. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1988 (2011).
181. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(I) (2008).
182. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977.
183. Id. at 1987.
184. Id. at 1971. This portion of the opinion was joined by only four members of
the Court. Three justices dissented, Justice Kagan recused herself, and Justice Thomas
declined to join this portion of the majority opinion.
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Control Act (IRCA).' 8 5 IRCA's bar to the employment of unauthorized
aliens was coupled with a prohibition against employment discrimina-
tion against aliens, and enacted against a background of federal law
which forbids employment discrimination on the basis of national ori-
gin.186 The prohibitions against those two forms of discrimination
were thought necessary because of the danger that employers would
seek to avoid liability for employing unauthorized aliens simply by re-
fusing to employ all aliens, or by discriminating against national ori-
gin groups (e.g., Hispanics) which an employer might believe likely
to include a significant number of unauthorized aliens.' 87 The plain-
tiffs argued that the severity of the sanctions imposed by the Arizona
statute would pressure employers into engaging in the types of discri-
mination forbidden by IRCA and Title VII.188 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, however, and predicted that employers would simply choose to
comply with both the state and federal requirements. 8 9
VII. NASA v. Nelson'90
In NASA v. Nelson, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding,
as it had twice before,19 that there is a constitutional interest in the
confidentiality of personal information, but held that any such right
had not been violated in the circumstances of the case.192
Nelson and the other plaintiffs worked at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL), which is owned by NASA but operated by the Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology. Because the plaintiffs were employees
of JPL, not NASA, they had not earlier been subject to government
background investigations. Beginning in 2004, however, the federal
government began to require standard background checks for contract
employees with long-term access to federal facilities.193 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated by two
aspects of that background check: (1) a form which required employees
who had used illegal drugs to disclose any drug treatment or counsel-
ing, and (2) a questionnaire sent to an employee's former employers
and others which inquired whether the reference knew, regarding the
employee, of "any adverse information" about several listed subjects
"or other matters."194
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1975; 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006).
187. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 68-69 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-682(11), at 11-12 (1986).
188. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984.
189. Id.
190. 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
191. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
192. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763-64.
193. Id. at 752.
194. Id. at 752-53.
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The Court set out a three-part methodology for analyzing such
informational privacy claims, although specifically reserving the ques-
tion of whether the Constitution protects privacy concerns of this type.
First, the Court examined the type and significance of the interest
assertedly served by the government's efforts to obtain the private in-
formation.' That interest is especially substantial, the Court held,
when the government acts as an employer dealing with its workforce,
rather than seeking to regulate private conduct. Here, the interest was
even greater because JPL did "important work . .. funded with a mul-
tibillion dollar [government] investment," overseeing space vehicles
that are critical to NASA's mission.196 For the purposes of this analy-
sis, it did not matter whether the workers involved were employees of
a federal contractor, rather than of the government itself.97
Second, the Court evaluated whether the inquiry regarding the
confidential information was "reasonable" and employment-related. 98
Like any employer, the opinion explained, the government is entitled
to have its projects staffed by "reliable, law-abiding persons who will ef-
ficiently and effectively discharge their duties."199 The Court held that
"questions about illegal-drug use are a useful way of figuring out which
persons have these characteristics."200 This reflects a broad view of the
type of personal characteristics and information a government em-
ployer might permissibly seek. The Court made clear that acquisition
of the requested confidential information need not be "necessary" to as-
sure that a worker meets this standard, or the only possible method of
determining whether that standard was met.201
Third, the Court considered whether the government's program
avoided an "undue risk of public dissemination."202 This seems to be
the part of the (still hypothetical) constitutional standard that imposes
the most significant limitation. This requirement is at least ordinarily
satisfied if a statute or regulation imposes on government officials with
access to personal information a legal duty not to make that informa-
tion public. In this case, federal law only permitted disclosure of back-
ground check information to individuals when disclosure was necessary
for evaluating the worker's fitness, or for some other purpose expressly
authorized by law. Such routine uses of background information, the
Court held, did not create any undue risk of public disclosure. 203
195. Id. at 757.
196. Id. at 759.
197. Id. at 758-59.
198. Id. at 759-60.
199. Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
200. Id. at 760.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 763.
203. Id.
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It is important that the Court applied this test not only to informa-
tion which the workers themselves were required to provide, but also
to information known to, and obtained from, schools, landlords, or for-
mer employers.204 The fact that someone other than the workers them-
selves already had access to the assertedly private information, even
third parties who could themselves legally have made the information
public, did not remove it from the (assumed) privacy protections.
VIII. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara 2 0 5
In 1997, the CIGNA Corporation altered its pension plan in a
manner that significantly reduced the benefits for certain employees,
and materially increased the risk of reduced benefits for others. 2 0 6
The new plan saved the company $10 million annually. In materials
sent to its employees at the time, however, CIGNA assured them that
their benefits would not be cut and that the company would not receive
any cost savings as a result of the change in the plan.2 07 The employees
sued 208 on behalf of approximately 25,000 plan beneficiaries claiming
the employer's actions violated the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).209
The district court concluded that CIGNA had violated its obliga-
tions under ERISA to provide beneficiaries with accurate information
about their rights and to notify them of any significant reduction in the
amount of future benefits.210 The trial court, relying on ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B), deemed the inaccurate company statements to be part of
the new benefit plan. It ordered class-wide relief, requiring that class
members be permitted to retain (as they had been promised) the ben-
efits that had accrued under the old plan prior to January 1, 1998, and
that they receive as well the additional benefits subsequently provided
by the new plan. 211 At the Supreme Court, CIGNA did not dispute the
findings that it had violated ERISA but argued that a plan beneficiary
could obtain relief only by showing detrimental reliance on the com-
pany's false statements. 212
The Court held that the disputed relief could not be ordered
under section 502(a)(1)(B). 213 That provision authorizes a civil action
by a beneficiary to "recover benefits due him under the terms of his
204. Id. at 761.
205. 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).
206. Id. at 1871-72.
207. Id. at 1872-73.
208. Id. at 1870.
209. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (2006)).
210. CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1870-71.
211. Id. at 1875-76.
212. Id. at 1880-82.
213. Id. at 1887-88.
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plan .... "214 The phrase "the plan," the Court held, referred only to
the actual pension plan, whose terms were, of course, adverse to the
plaintiffs. The misleadingly positive written materials which CIGNA
had given its workers were not part of the actual plan, and section
502(a)(1)(B) provided only for enforcement of the plan as written,
not of the plan as reformed by the court.215
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that section 502(a)(3),
which permits a plaintiff "to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief,"
could provide authority for the type of remedy ordered by the district
court. 2 1 6 ERISA typically treats a benefit plan as a trust and the rele-
vant officials as fiduciaries; claims by trust beneficiaries were actions
in equity. Among the traditional equitable remedies available are re-
formation (including reformation of a contract), estoppel (holding a de-
fendant to its representations), and surcharge (compensation for a loss
resulting from a trustee's breach of duty). The standards governing
each of these remedies differ, and those differences are likely to be im-
portant in future litigation.
The remedy of estoppel, the Court concluded, does require a show-
ing of detrimental reliance.21 7 As Justice Scalia noted in his separate
opinion, individualized determinations of detrimental reliance by each
plan participant would at the least raise challenging questions in a
class action. 218
The imposition on a trustee of a surcharge (monetary compensa-
tion for a loss resulting from a trustee's breach of duty) requires a
showing that the breach resulted in actual harm to the trust benefi-
ciary. Where, as in this case, the breach of duty was a failure to provide
beneficiaries with accurate information, there would have to be a
showing of a causal connection between those inaccuracies and harm
to a beneficiary. Proof of detrimental reliance would be one method
of establishing that causal connection, but it would not be the only
way. The Court held, for example, that the necessary showing could
be made by evidence that an injured employee who did not rely on
or even read the false statements had assumed that fellow employees
would have informed the employee if, for example, plan changes would
likely be harmful.219 In such a situation, the false statements, by mis-
leading other workers into believing the plan would not be harmful
and thus not warning the claimant, could be said to have caused the
injury to the employee in question. Proof of that sort of causation, how-
ever, might also require some sort of individualized inquiry.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
215. Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-78.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006); CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-80.
217. Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 1880-82.
218. Id. at 1885.
219. Id. at 1881.
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Reformation, on the other hand, seems to be the equitable doctrine
that supports the sort of class-wide remedy in this case. Where refor-
mation is sought, the violation is not the falsity of the statements
(here, made to workers), but the failure to frame the underlying docu-
ment (a contract or, in this case, a trust) in a manner that conforms to
what has been openly announced. In such a situation, the remedy is to
reform the contract or trust to match the representations that were
made to the other party; that would support the type of class-wide re-
medy in this type of case, because employers usually make the same
representations to all their workers. A defendant could defeat that re-
medy as to a particular beneficiary only by showing that the claimant
was negligent in not realizing that the plan was different than the com-
pany's statements, that the negligence fell below a standard of "reason-
able prudence," and that the negligence "violate[d] a legal duty."2 2 0 It
would probably be difficult for an employer to show that a worker was
negligent in failing to recognize the inaccuracy of the employer's own
false statements.
ILX. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 2 2 1
A significant number of employers today require their workers, as
a condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate most employment
claims. Because such agreements are generally within the scope of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 222 states cannot impose an outright
ban on the arbitration of employment claims. The FAA, however, ordi-
narily permits the invalidation or limitation of arbitration agreements
under state law that governs "the revocation of any contract."223 For
that reason, state unconscionability law has repeatedly been applied
to arbitration agreements governing employment and other sorts of
claims, so long as the state law does not single out and disfavor arbi-
tration. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that state-law rules
establishing even general contract defenses may be unenforceable
under the FAA if they stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the FAA's objectives. 224
Concepcion involved a claim by consumers that AT&T had en-
gaged in fraud and false advertising by claiming that certain cell
phones were free. 225 The contract signed by AT&T customers required
them to arbitrate any disputes with the company and expressly barred
arbitration of class claims. 226 California courts concluded that this
220. Id.
221. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
222. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
223. Id. § 2.
224. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
225. Id. at 1744.
226. Id. at 1744-75.
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prohibition was unconscionable, reasoning that the size of the indivi-
dual claims was so small that few if any customers would pursue indi-
vidual claims, leaving merchants free deliberately to cheat large num-
bers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.2 2 7
The Supreme Court concluded that this state-law unconscionabil-
ity rule was inconsistent with the purposes of the FAA. Class arbitra-
tion, the Court reasoned, would necessarily be both lengthy and forma-
lized, thus defeating the central goal of the FAA to facilitate the use of
a speedy and informal arbitration process.2 2 8 In addition, precisely
because arbitration is informal, and subject to only limited judicial
review, the Court thought potential defendants would be unlikely to
agree to arbitration if class actions were required because they
would not want to subject themselves to a possible error-prone process
when the total value of the claims was substantial. 2 2 9 Potential plain-
tiffs, on the other hand, would probably favor arbitration class actions
because it would be possible to obtain the assistance of class counsel in
such proceedings, and because an aggrieved consumer could obtain re-
lief without having to initiate an individual arbitration proceeding.
The Court's conclusion that requiring class actions would reduce the
use of arbitration reflected the majority's tacit understanding that
whether contracts for the sale of consumer goods (like employment con-
tracts) require arbitration is dictated by the merchant (or employer),
not the consumer. Thus, the FAA's policy of encouraging the use of
arbitration evidently requires that the legal standards governing arbi-
tration agreements must favor vendors over consumers, or employers
over employees, so that the party with the economic power to select or
reject arbitration will decide in favor of using it. This seems an econom-
ically realistic, albeit somewhat distasteful, method of analysis.
Whether this decision will have a substantial effect in labor and
employment cases was called into question by the January 2012
NLRB decision in D.R. Horton, Inc.230 In D.R. Horton, the Board
held that an employer limitation on the freedom of workers to partici-
pate in a class action would violate the statutory right to engage in
"concerted activities."231 Because that right applies to all covered em-
ployees, regardless of whether they belong to a union, the NLRB's de-
cision, unless struck down, seems likely to limit the reach of Concep-
cion to workers who are not covered by the NLRA's right to engage
in concerted activity.
227. Id. at 1745.
228. Id. at 1747-48.
229. Id. at 1745.
230. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012).
231. Id. at *12; 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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X. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri 232
This decision resolved a disagreement among the courts of appeals
regarding the scope of rights of government employees under the First
Amendment's Petition Clause.233 Connick v. MyerS2 3 4 had earlier held
that the Free Speech Clause only protects the speech of government
workers when they are speaking as citizens on a matter of public con-
cern. 2 3 5 Although the Petition Clause applies to somewhat different
types of activities than the Free Speech Clause, most circuits similarly
had concluded that the Petition Clause protects petitioning by govern-
ment employees only when the subject of the petition is a matter of
public concern. Rejecting the contrary view of the Third Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that the Connick standard governs Petition
Clause claims.236 Justices Scalia and Thomas in separate opinions ar-
gued that Petition Clause claims should not be limited by the Connick
standard. They would have held that the Clause does not protect peti-
tions addressed to the government as an employer.237 This decision
leaves the law where it was in most circuits.238
232. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
233. U.S. CONs. amend. I.
234. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
235. Id. at 147.
236. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2500-01.
237. Id. at 2501-02.
238. See, e.g., Martin v. Del City, 179 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1999).
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